The far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) won a landslide in Saxony-Anhalt on 6 September, becoming the largest party in the state parliament with 44% of the vote on a record turnout, according to the German writer Carolin Würfel. In a commentary for the Guardian, Würfel, who was born in East Germany, argues that this result is not due to an inherited longing for dictatorship among easterners, but rather a function of the deeply troubled relationship between the former East and West Germany.
East German grievances and the AfD's rise
Würfel, who grew up in Saxony, recounts that the presence of rightwing extremists was part of her coming-of-age experience in the late 1990s and early 2000s. She notes that every Friday night there was fear of neo-Nazi attacks outside clubs and bars, and every 1 May was a flashpoint when neo-Nazis were allowed to march through the city centre. Despite this, Saxony's first post-reunification prime minister, Kurt Biedenkopf, a West German CDU politician, repeatedly promised that "Saxony is immune to rightwing extremism."
By 2004, the far-right National Democratic party (NPD) entered the Saxon state parliament for the first time with 9.2% of the vote. Würfel left Saxony for Berlin in 2005, partly because of the dangerous presence of neo-Nazis. She states that rightwing extremism has grown steadily in eastern Germany ever since, with the names changing from NPD to Pegida to the AfD.
West German responsibility and historical context
Würfel points out that the AfD was founded in west Germany, with a large share of its leadership born and raised in western states such as Rheinland-Pfalz and Nordrhein-Westfalen. She questions what draws a certain kind of west German towards building such a party and choosing the east as a place to make it grow. She argues that west German states, which claimed to have carried out denazification after 1945, need to look just as urgently at why this fascination with fascism keeps recurring.
She references an interview given by Magnus Brechtken, deputy director of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, to the FAZ newspaper. Brechtken argued that the differences east Germans complain about are now emotional rather than rational, and that west Germans have spent 75 years proving they understand democracy. Würfel believes he was right that the AfD's popularity should serve as a reminder of historical facts, but suggests he did not ask the follow-up questions about west German responsibility.
Economic disparity and the Treuhand legacy
Würfel highlights the visible inequalities in the east as excellent material for the AfD to organise around. She notes that in 1989, many east Germans hoped for something between socialism and capitalism, and reunification was not necessarily the preferred option. The Treuhand agency, in charge of privatising the former GDR's economy, oversaw the takeover of 94% of East German companies by West German or international investors, leaving only 6% with the people of East Germany. Approximately 2 million jobs were eliminated in the east.
In 1990-91, people took to the streets against the perceived occupier, West Germany, demanding new elections and renegotiation of agreements. Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, head of the Treuhand, was asked in an interview whether he feared another revolution in East Germany if things did not improve. Würfel describes the former East Germany as being treated like a child that had to follow the laws of its wiser western parent, and now that child is grown but remembers the experience.
AfD's strategy and national threat
Ulrich Siegmund, the AfD's candidate in Saxony-Anhalt, promised to take back control and at his victory press conference said the result showed people wouldn't be "patronised" any longer. Würfel observes that during the campaign, Siegmund threw parties with free sausages and beer, telling hollowed-out villages and small towns that they matter. She argues that the AfD gave people attention in exchange for a vote, and that this was what counted most.
Würfel concludes that the AfD's triumph is a national problem, not a regional one. She notes that the party's programme runs on racism, belief in superiority, and contempt for those who don't belong. She draws a historical parallel: in April 1932, the Nazi party became the strongest party in the region now making up Saxony-Anhalt with 40.7% of the vote and formed the first Nazi-led state government in Germany. She warns that whatever happens next, it will be hard to say we didn't know.
