Ukraine Seeks to Cut Chinese Drone Parts, Turns to Taiwan as Alternative
Ukraine Seeks to Cut Chinese Drone Parts, Turns to Taiwan

Over the four years that Ukraine has been fighting to repel Russian forces, its battlefields have become scarred by airstrikes, pockmarked by artillery fire, and littered with the wreckage of cheap aerial drones. The conflict has transformed the economics of modern warfare, with both sides reliant on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to monitor the battlefield, evade defences, and strike deep into enemy territory. The fighting has kept Russia bogged down, allowing Kyiv to remake the country's industrial base to meet wartime needs.

Ukraine's New Target: Chinese Components

Now Ukraine has a new target – to free its drone supply chains of components from China, even as it ramps up production to meet its army's growing needs. Despite repeated denials from Beijing, Ukraine accuses China of aiding Russia with military goods. Amid broader concerns about China's dominance of industrial supply chains and security risks, Ukraine, along with Europe, the US, and other countries, has increasingly turned to Taiwan as an alternative supplier.

Taiwan as a Favoured Alternative

Taiwan's reputation for excellence in technology, particularly in microelectronics, navigation systems, and batteries – areas where western suppliers have struggled – makes it a favoured alternative source for Ukrainian drone manufacturers, according to the Snake Island Institute (SII), an independent Ukrainian thinktank. Taiwan appears ready to meet the moment, with its president, Lai Ching-te, promoting a US$40bn supplementary defence budget that includes funding for drones and AI integration.

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Taiwanese drone exports to Europe surged more than 40-fold in 2025, with Poland and Czechia among the largest markets, according to the Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology (DSET). Exports in the first quarter of 2026 have already surpassed last year's total. Most drones were intended for onward transfer to Ukraine, with these countries acting as intermediaries.

Bohdan Diorditsa, chief international alliances officer at Vyriy, a leading Ukrainian drone maker, says: “We have components that are made in Taiwan, and that is not unusual in the industry now.” He notes that fears of China tightening export controls drive the search for alternatives, calling Taiwan “100% a valuable partner” due to its strengths in semiconductors and electronics integration.

Localisation Remains Primary Focus

Ultimately, localisation remains Ukraine's primary focus, says Artur Savchii, an analyst at SII. Each year of war has pushed production inward: from mainly importing Chinese finished drones to assembling them almost entirely domestically. By last year, Ukraine had over 100 component manufacturers, according to the defence ministry. Ukrainian companies tailor systems for frontline combat in ways mass-market Chinese suppliers often cannot.

However, Ukraine is unlikely to scale up drone production without any Chinese components in the near term, because Chinese parts remain significantly cheaper and more widely available. Even components produced elsewhere, such as lithium batteries and rare-earth magnets, often rely on Chinese materials.

Taiwan's Own Dependency and Limitations

Taiwan is not free from this dependency. China remains its biggest source of drone imports, though figures include civilian models. Taipei has pledged to build a fully “non-red” drone industry by 2027 and produce a third of rare-earth magnets by 2030, but these transitions are a work in progress. The scale of what Taiwan can offer is also limited; Ukraine's demand is measured in millions of drones a year, while Taiwan's current output is in the hundreds of thousands.

Gene Su, general manager of Thunder Tiger, one of Taiwan's biggest drone-makers, notes that Chinese products retain a price advantage, with some models costing a fraction of Taiwanese equivalents. His company has sent drone systems to Ukraine for field testing. “They test it, they like it, but they don't buy it because it's still too expensive,” Su says.

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Geopolitical Obstacles

Geopolitics is another obstacle. Ukraine does not formally recognise Taiwan and maintains cautious ties with China, its largest trading partner. Much cooperation flows indirectly through intermediaries in Poland, Czechia, and the US, with little formal government-level coordination and most engagement business-to-business.

Taiwanese companies remain nimble; some have established local facilities in Lithuania and Poland to better serve Ukraine, and a government body has signed memorandums of understanding with five European countries. As demand for AI-driven drones grows, experts see potential for deeper cooperation. Taiwan's ministry of economic affairs has pledged to support seven hi-tech companies with about NT$326m ($10m) to develop drone-specific chips.

For Ukrainian manufacturers like Diorditsa, the decision of where to source components comes down to what is best for the military – a combination of strategic thinking and efficiency. “We build weapons not under market pressure or energy pressure. We're under pressure to survive,” he says.