Germany must neither ban the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) nor embrace it, but instead constrain it legally and fight it politically, according to historian and political writer Timothy Garton Ash. Writing in the Guardian, Ash argues that while the AfD's recent regional electoral victory in Saxony-Anhalt has alarmed observers worldwide, the most convincing formula for defending German democracy is a middle path that avoids both prohibition and normalization.
A Regional Victory with National Implications
The AfD's success in Saxony-Anhalt has triggered global concern, not least because of Germany's central role in Europe. The party's national co-leader Alice Weidel has stated that if the AfD enters government after the federal election scheduled for 2029, Germany would abandon the euro and leave the Schengen border-free travel area, raising questions about the future of the European Union itself.
Ash acknowledges that the instinctive response to such developments is "because it's Germany!"—a reference to the country's history of Nazi dictatorship until 1945, communist rule in East Germany until 1989, and two world wars. He notes that some AfD language echoes Nazi rhetoric, sending "a cold shudder down the spine" for those familiar with it.
The Case Against a Ban
The German constitution allows for banning political parties deemed "hostile" to its basic liberal democratic principles, and senior politicians have called for such action against the AfD. However, Ash argues it is "too late for that." The AfD has been a major force in the Bundestag since 2017, when it gained representation following the migration crisis, and has led nationwide opinion polls, similar to Reform UK in Britain.
"To suddenly tell so many citizens 'you're not allowed to vote for the party you support!' would itself be an assault on democracy," Ash writes. He distinguishes this from "democracy as the tyranny of the majority," emphasizing that liberal democracy constrains popular outcomes through rule of law, human and minority rights, and pluralist institutions.
Legal and Administrative Constraints
Ash points to Article 37 of the German constitution, which allows federal authorities to overrule anti-constitutional behavior by states—a provision never used in the republic's 77-year history. If the AfD forms the state government in Saxony-Anhalt, he argues, all federal powers should be employed to prevent sensitive intelligence about Russian aggression from being shared with a Saxony-Anhalt security service branch controlled by the pro-Russian AfD. He also urges securing judicial independence, police and civil service neutrality, and preventing extreme politicization of education and public broadcasting.
"Of course, AfD politicians will cry 'foul!'; tough," Ash states. "If, as they say, they want 'another republic', they can go and live in Russia."
The Political Battle
Beyond legal constraints, Ash emphasizes the need for a robust political response. He cautions against Christian Democrats abandoning the "firewall" and embracing AfD politicians, despite arguments that inclusion would expose their incoherence or moderate them, as allegedly happened with Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy. Citing political scientists' evidence, he warns that inclusion strategies "are just as likely to put more wind in the nationalists' sails," noting that AfD activists themselves warn against "Melonisierung" (Melonisation).
Instead, Ash urges Christian Democrats to define themselves by what they support, not just what they oppose. He recommends implementing labour market, pension, tax, and other reforms agreed with their Social Democrat coalition partners, and boldly advocating European-scale solutions to challenges like Russian aggression and US and Chinese AI dominance.
Ash also stresses the need for "emotional intelligence" (EI) alongside artificial intelligence. He attributes the success of AfD's Ulrich Siegmund in Saxony-Anhalt, as well as Trump and Nigel Farage, to emotional communication—conveying "I'm here with you; I hear you and see you; I share your anger." He references exiled German political scientist Karl Loewenstein's 1937 article on "militant democracy," which insisted democracy cannot "devise emotional formulas capable of competing with the fascist Pied Pipers."
In today's transformed information environment, Ash argues, democracy cannot be defended solely by legal constraints and rational policies. Democrats must compete on the emotional plane through constant social media presence and physical presence on the ground. He cites Hungary's Prime Minister Péter Magyar and the UK's Andy Burnham as examples of this approach, concluding that much now depends on German democrats, especially Christian Democrats, proving they can do the same.
