The deadly collapse of a Florida beachfront condominium in 2021 began weeks before the final destruction, according to a final report released Monday by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The building had been vulnerable from its inception due to design flaws and alterations over its 40-year history.
Initial Failures and Structural Vulnerabilities
NIST investigators found that two connections between garage columns and the pool deck started failing around early June 2021. The building's design did not meet the building codes in place at the time, and its construction deviated from the approved plans. For instance, large planters were added on the pool deck, which further compromised the structure.
“When building structures are designed and built to required codes and standards, they have margins against failure, meaning they should be able to support much more load than they are expected to bear,” said Judith Mitrani-Reiser, who co-led the investigation. “In the case of Champlain Towers South, these margins against failure were too narrow from the start.”
The Collapse Sequence
Most residents were asleep when the 12-story building in Surfside, Florida, collapsed at 1:22 a.m. on June 24, 2021, killing 98 people. The dead included members of the local Orthodox Jewish community and the sister of Paraguay's first lady, along with her family and their nanny. A Miami judge approved a $1 billion settlement for personal injury and wrongful death claims.
The pool deck began collapsing minutes before two sections of the tower. A strong concrete wall prevented the destruction from spreading to a third section. Witnesses described the pool deck collapsing “one bay at a time as if dominoes were falling in a sequential chain reaction,” Mitrani-Reiser said. Some reported feeling a sudden wind in the lobby and hearing sounds like a “jet engine.”
Evidence of Distress
Photos taken in the weeks before the collapse showed a long crack in a planter wall on the pool deck and cracks where the planter wall met a planter box. Less than a day before the collapse, that planter detached from the pool deck. About a week earlier, water leaking from a ceiling in the parking garage increased; one person described it as a “water faucet” hours before the destruction.
NIST also found that reinforcing steel in the pool deck and street-level parking slabs was corroded in some areas. Work done later around the pool, including adding sand and pavers, further strained an “already structurally inadequate” system, Mitrani-Reiser said.
Policy Changes After the Collapse
The companies responsible for designing and building the original structure in the late 1970s are no longer in operation. Following the disaster, Florida legislators enacted a law in 2022 requiring condo associations to have sufficient reserves for major repairs. Some residents faced unexpected hefty fees to cover deferred maintenance, leading to another law providing more flexibility in handling costs.
Attorney Harley Tropin, who represented victims' families and survivors in a class-action lawsuit, declined to comment on the new report.
