After months of conflict, the United States has struggled to compel Iran to restore stable passage through the strait of Hormuz, let alone accept core demands such as abandoning its nuclear program, dismantling missile forces, and canceling regional proxy networks. Iran's military is degraded and its regime disrupted, but it continues to prevent most countries from shipping oil, gas, fertilizer, and helium through the strait. The global economy is at risk, President Donald Trump's domestic approval is sliding, Russia is profiting, and US military preparedness—especially in the Indo-Pacific—is suffering.
The US is superior to Iran on every measure of national power, possessing overwhelming military forces, the world's largest economy, and the ability to cut nations off from global markets through the dollar's power. Yet Iran has been able to frustrate US designs thoroughly. The core problem is that while Trump has claimed to be negotiating, he has relied almost exclusively on military and economic pressure rather than genuine diplomacy. A more workable approach would offer Tehran assurances and incentives substantial enough to make the risks of a deal worth taking, while respecting the regime's red lines.
Trump's approach is a form of coercive diplomacy, which has worked in the past—for example, with Slobodan Milošević over Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. However, coercive diplomacy requires demands that the adversary can meet without jeopardizing its survival. Washington's demands have verged on unilateral disarmament, which Tehran sees as surrendering defenses essential to regime survival. Paradoxically, escalating military pressure makes Tehran more likely to conclude that stronger deterrent capabilities—including control over the strait—are vital. Trump's 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal also underscores that Washington might pocket concessions and return to hostilities.
Iran today has more capacity to absorb pressure than past targets of coercive diplomacy. Drones, missiles, cyber tools, and information operations allow it to harass US assets, allies, and global shipping. Moreover, Iran has powerful external supporters: China provides economic and diplomatic support, while Russia offers military and political backing. Breaking the stalemate requires a more realistic negotiating position that accepts the US bottom line cannot be effective Iranian disarmament. No Iranian government can agree to that and survive. Any substantial deal will likely require near-term sanctions relief substantial enough to make political risks worthwhile for Tehran. Iran also needs hope that Washington will honor the deal rather than pivot back to regime change. Third-party participation—China, Europe, possibly Gulf states—would help achieve this.
Getting more flexibility in the US position will be tough, especially because regional allies will resist sanctions relief unless there are major Iranian concessions on nuclear and missile fronts. The alternative is a continued stalemate where Russia profits, China's leverage grows, allies in the Indo-Pacific watch American resources drain into another Middle Eastern war, and the global economy risks recession. If negotiation on major issues proves impossible, the realistic floor is to negotiate a return to prewar freedom of navigation through the strait and a freeze on further military escalation. This may be the direction the administration is headed. Trump can sell damage to Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure as a victory, but in reality, it would not be a success. However, it would stop the erosion of American power caused by this war.
Trump's bind in Iran is the predictable outcome of the conceit that overwhelming military and economic power can substitute for compromise. This conceit has repeatedly produced strategic disappointment for major powers—from Iraq to Ukraine—proving that military power is no substitute for real diplomacy.
