In the capital of the Solomon Islands, Honiara, a quiet but intense contest for influence is unfolding, with China and Australia adopting markedly different approaches to supporting the nation's police force. This geopolitical tussle, described by Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong as a "permanent contest" to be the Pacific's "partner of choice," is playing out through community halls and police headquarters across the archipelago.
Contrasting Strategies: Formal Partnerships vs Community Engagement
The divergence in strategy is stark. At a church hall on Honiara's outskirts, local community leader Ben Angoa speaks enthusiastically about training sessions organised by Chinese police, which come alongside tangible gifts like solar lighting, sewing machines, and even noodle-making lessons. "We really love China," Angoa states, praising the direct "impact in the community" that he feels is lacking from other partners.
Conversely, Australia's approach is characterised by formal, institutional partnerships focused on building the capability of the 1,100-strong Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. According to the Australian Federal Police, their support programme is budgeted at over $170 million, with former Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's government announcing a further $190 million in commitments in 2024, though reports suggest this initiative has since stalled.
Associate Professor Graeme Smith, a China and Pacific scholar at the Australian National University, notes the fundamental difference. "Australia's approach is through formal partnerships and that excludes the involvement of community leaders," he explains. "This approach obscures the fact that most disputes are managed by community leaders and not the formal police." He characterises China's method as "the classic Chinese urban policing model which mixes control with paternalism."
Cars, Advisers and a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape
The competition has tangible, and sometimes overlapping, results. Both nations have donated so many police vehicles that the Honiara police headquarters has been compared to a dusty used car lot. Both provide advisers who rotate through local stations, and both host Solomon Islands officers for training abroad.
However, the scale differs. Australia maintains roughly three times as many police personnel in Honiara as China, which has only about a dozen trainers on the ground. This disparity highlights their divergent philosophies: Australia's deep, institutional investment versus China's targeted, community-focused engagement.
The backdrop to this contest is a significant geopolitical shift. In 2019, Solomon Islands switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to Beijing. This was followed in 2022 by a controversial security pact with China, which triggered anxiety in Canberra about losing influence in a region it has long considered its patch. Australia had previously spent over $2.3 billion on a regional assistance mission following a breakdown of law and order in the early 2000s.
A Battle for Hearts and Minds with No Clear Victor
Within the Solomon Islands, opinions on which partner is more effective remain divided. Daniel Waneoroa, the Minister for Rural Development, sees international support as a "win-win" but admits coordinating multiple partners is challenging. Former politician Felix Bosokuru believes China's efforts are working, suggesting "Australia needs to remix the record and stop playing the same song."
Senior opposition figure Peter Kenilorea Jr observes the farcical element of the "so many cars" but acknowledges the critical value of Australian aid, such as providing Guardian-class patrol boats. Yet, he expresses concern that the geopolitical jostling is creating rifts within the police force, with senior figures perceived as pro-Beijing or pro-Canberra.
"There is a battle for hearts and minds going on," Kenilorea Jr says, pointing to large Australian billboards recently erected around Honiara. When asked who is succeeding in this contest, his answer is unequivocal: "China is, definitely." Despite this, Professor Smith concludes that for now, "It's hard to say who's winning," indicating that this multifaceted struggle for influence in the strategically crucial Pacific nation is far from over.
